Pelorus Fund investors must act now — replace current management with competent, unconflicted fund managers who will work to protect and return your capital.
Register Now →Asset stripping: According to filed arbitration proceedings, fund assets are being transferred into entities controlled by Daniel Leimel Jr.'s son, Ethan Leimel — moving value that belongs to investors directly into the Leimel family's name.
30 months gated. Distributions: essentially zero. No timeline to unlock. The Fund suspended redemptions in December 2023. For all of 2024 and into 2025, distributions were reduced to de minimis levels — de minimis distributions — a fraction of the income investors subscribed for. As of April 30, 2026, even those de minimis distributions were halted entirely. Investors have received $0 in distributions since April 30, 2026 and have no ability to exit. No credible timeline for lifting the gate or resuming distributions has ever been provided.
For context: comparable publicly traded cannabis lending funds — Chicago Atlantic Real Estate Finance (REFI) and AFC Gamma (AFCG) — both paid distributions throughout the same period. REFI paid ~14–17% annually, uninterrupted. Even AFCG — which cut its dividend 69% and lost ~60% of its value — never stopped paying; investors collected ~$2.60/share in cash and could sell at any time. Pelorus investors received de minimis distributions — then nothing.
7 active legal proceedings filed against management. Their own Managing Partner resigned. Their CFO resigned. Their auditors resigned. The Fund's lawyers sued them for unpaid bills.
No timeline. No plan. No distributions. Management has never provided a credible timeline to lift the gate, resume meaningful distributions, or return investor capital. Every month the gate remains in place, management continues to collect management fees. Investors do not receive income, cannot exit, and have received no substantive explanation for when that will change.
Sued by multiple unrelated investor groups in multiple states. Leimel and Sechrist are defendants in separate legal actions brought by independent groups of investors with no connection to each other — in California and Pennsylvania — alleging breach of contract, fraud, and related claims. This is not an isolated grievance from a single disgruntled investor. Multiple unrelated parties, represented by separate counsel, have independently reached the same conclusion.
They lost an arbitration — and are refusing to pay. An independent JAMS arbitrator reviewed the evidence, found a credible basis for wrongdoing, and ordered Pelorus Capital Group to produce its books and records and pay $347,414.84 in fees and costs. Pelorus has refused to comply with either order — not a single document produced, not a dollar paid. A Petition to Confirm the Award is now before Orange County Superior Court and enforcement proceedings are active. This is not a dispute about the merits. The arbitrator already ruled. They are simply defying a legal order. Ask yourself: if they had nothing to hide, why refuse to open the books?
One investor is being paid. You are not. While the gate is in place and distributions to all other limited partners have been halted, one LP in the fund is reported to be receiving a 10% preferred return — approximately $45,000 per month. All other investors receive nothing, cannot exit, and have been given no explanation for this disparity.
They are spending significant money — potentially including gated investor capital — to fight disclosure and silence a whistleblower. Based on fee records produced in the JAMS arbitration, Leimel and Sechrist spent 17 months and hundreds of thousands of dollars fighting a books and records request — and substantially more across all active proceedings. The source of those funds has not been disclosed. Investors who cannot access their own capital have every right to ask: who is paying for this legal defense, and where is that money coming from?
If you find this behavior acceptable — do nothing. If you find it objectionable, or outright abhorrent, join the investor coalition calling for the removal of Pelorus management. We need 500 of approximately 1,000 investors to formally register. Your voice matters.
Two qualified replacement managers are ready to step in. The investor coalition has identified at least two experienced, non-conflicted fund managers prepared to assume control — including an institutional cannabis credit manager with a direct track record of prior manager replacements delivering substantial investor recoveries, and a national restructuring specialist with deep fiduciary experience managing distressed real estate and cannabis limited partnerships. Investors have a clear path to full recovery of their original investment.
Pelorus Fund investor? Join the coalition — protect and recover your capital.
Join the Coalition →The following allegations are drawn directly from filed legal proceedings, including a derivative arbitration demand and a verified complaint filed under penalty of perjury in California Superior Court, both brought on behalf of the Fund itself. These are not opinions — they are formal legal allegations made by investors and their counsel in filed proceedings before tribunals.
According to the derivative arbitration demand, Leimel and Sechrist "covertly misappropriated $52 million in Fund capital and loaned it out to other companies that they control and own." These loans were concealed from the Fund's approximately 1,000 limited partners, were not disclosed to auditors, and were not submitted for investor committee review as required by the Fund's operating agreement.
This is perhaps the most damning single fact in the case. The arbitration demand states: "Prior to [instituting the gate], Leimel took unlawful action to ensure that the investor gate that he was planning did not impact his own personal liquidity. In the months immediately leading up to the gate — when Respondents knew the gate was coming and no other investor did — Leimel took a significant amount of his invested capital out of the Fund." He withdrew his own capital while knowing the gate was coming — before any other investor had the chance to do the same. He locked 1,000 investors in and walked himself out the door first.
The arbitration demand alleges that Respondents paid a confidential settlement to an investor who had threatened legal action after learning of some of Respondents' wrongdoing, requiring that investor to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Leimel and Sechrist redeemed that investor's interest in full. The filing notes: "Meanwhile, all of the other investors of the Fund have had their investments frozen for more than two years by the gate instituted by Respondents. Knowing that investors would be dismayed by this information, Respondents concealed it from them."
During the investor voting window for the Pelorus Growth Fund spinoff (July 2025), management simultaneously: (i) caused the Fund to go into default on a $2.5M Fund-guaranteed loan; (ii) personally defaulted on $5.3M of guaranteed loans; and (iii) allowed Lost Winds and JRS Capital to default on a further $2.8M. All of this was concealed from voters. Additionally, the demand reveals that management received better competing bids for Fund assets and hid them from investors prior to the vote. The spinoff vote was won through deliberate concealment of material adverse facts.
The misconduct was discovered by the Fund's only non-conflicted general partner member in early 2022. Rather than disclose, Leimel and Sechrist engaged in "three years' worth of misstatements, lies, and obfuscation." When an independent committee was formed under Fund Counsel's direction, Respondents terminated the law firm overseeing it to eliminate the disclosure threat. They then purportedly expelled the whistleblower from the General Partnership in retaliation. The conflict committee's own analysis was never shared with investors before the spinoff vote.
Ethan Leimel — Daniel Leimel Jr.'s son — is a named respondent in the derivative arbitration. The filing alleges that Ethan aided and abetted his co-respondents' breach of fiduciary duty by knowingly participating in the Asset Stripping Transactions and, specifically, by taking control of an entity that now holds a federal marijuana manufacturing license — an asset the filing contends should belong to the Fund and its investors.
In September 2024, Arena Investors, LP — an institutional lender that had provided financing to the Pelorus Fund — publicly raised serious concerns about undisclosed collateral replacement and what they described as "incomplete and inaccurate" portfolio information provided by Pelorus management. A counterparty with a direct contractual relationship and access to Fund-level data concluded that Pelorus was not being truthful about its portfolio. This is not an investor allegation — this is a sophisticated institutional lender documenting Pelorus's misrepresentations to the market.
Three of the most important checks on fund management all concluded they could no longer remain associated with Pelorus. Travis Goad, a Managing Partner of the General Partner, resigned after discovering the self-dealing — management subsequently attempted to expel him in retaliation for attempting to protect investors. Tyler Grief, the Fund's Chief Financial Officer, resigned over management's conduct. Most strikingly, CohnReznick LLP — the Fund's external auditors — resigned. When a firm like CohnReznick walks away, it means one thing: they are not willing to put their name on the numbers or stand behind management's representations.
The arbitration demand confirms what many investors suspected: "the driving purpose of the spinoff was for Respondents to name themselves as managers of the new entity and create additional and unnecessary management fee income for themselves." Management used the spinoff to generate a new, ongoing fee stream — not to benefit original Fund investors, who remained locked in. During the same voting window, management was collecting fees while defaulting on loans they personally guaranteed. This is the governance failure in its clearest form.
These are not opinions — they are formal legal proceedings. Add your voice to the coalition.
Join the Coalition →All proceedings listed below are active as of 2026. Public court documents are available for download in the Documents section below.
The flagship investor action, filed derivatively on behalf of the Fund itself. Alleges a coordinated scheme by Leimel and Sechrist to misappropriate $52 million in Fund capital through secret related-party loans to entities they personally owned and controlled, concealed from investors for years. Filed via the American Arbitration Association.
Following investor action challenging management's misconduct, Pelorus Fund LLC filed a counter-arbitration proceeding against Travis Goad — one of the investors who surfaced the self-dealing scheme. This filing is widely viewed as a retaliatory action designed to silence and financially burden an investor who is exercising his rights.
Travis Goad and TGCA Pel LLC brought a JAMS arbitration demanding access to the books and records of Pelorus Capital Group, LLC — the management company itself. After reviewing the evidence, the arbitrator found a credible basis for wrongdoing and ruled clearly in investors' favor: Pelorus Capital Group was ordered to produce its books and records and pay $347,414.84 in fees and costs. Pelorus has complied with neither order — refusing to produce a single document and refusing to pay the award. A Petition to Confirm the Award was filed in Orange County Superior Court on April 10, 2026. Enforcement and collections proceedings are now underway.
This is not a dispute about the merits — an independent arbitrator already found a credible basis for wrongdoing and ruled. Pelorus is simply refusing to comply with a legal order. What are they hiding?
Filed September 23, 2025 in Orange County Superior Court (Case No. 30-2025-01513886). Investor Rick Howell sues for Breach of Contract (two counts), Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Money Had and Received, Money Lent, Account Stated, and Promissory Estoppel. Defendants include the Fund entities and both individual managers personally.
Filed October 3, 2025 in Orange County Superior Court (Case No. 30-2025-01516713). A companion lawsuit by Rick Howell targeting the specific entities — M3CP Holdings, JRS Capital, and Lost Winds Capital — through which Leimel and Sechrist allegedly received Fund capital. Claims include Breach of Contract, Money Had and Received, Money Lent, and Promissory Estoppel.
Filed in Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas by Leyda Bequer, represented by Christopher W. Cahillane, Esquire. Alleges breach of guaranty and fraud related to a commercial real estate loan. This case highlights that Pelorus's legal exposure extends beyond California and beyond its own limited partners.
Filed September 10, 2024 in Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (Case No. 2024-CH-08506, Judge Jerry A. Esrig). Greenspoon Marder LLP — the law firm Pelorus hired to advise on compliance with its own Related Party Transaction policies — sued Pelorus Fund for failing to pay fees owed under their engagement letter. The engagement covered legal services specifically related to ensuring that Pelorus's related party transactions "would not defraud Pelorus investors." Pelorus hired a law firm to help them handle the very self-dealing at the center of this investor action, then refused to pay the bill. Even management's own advisors couldn't get paid.
Seven active legal proceedings. One coalition demanding accountability. Join us.
Join the Coalition →Cannabis lending funds are income investments. Investors come in for cash flow — regular distributions backed by senior-secured loan portfolios. The two most comparable publicly traded peers — AFC Gamma (AFCG) and Chicago Atlantic Real Estate Finance (REFI) — both paid continuous distributions throughout the cannabis market downturn. Pelorus gated redemptions in December 2023, reduced distributions to de minimis levels, and halted all distributions entirely as of April 30, 2026.
The comparison below is not just about price appreciation — it is about cash in hand. A Pelorus investor who subscribed for income has been locked out for 29+ months, received only de minimis distributions since the gate, and has received nothing at all since April 30, 2026. A comparable REFI investor collected an estimated $14–16% annually in dividends while retaining the ability to sell at any time. That is the real cost of Pelorus's governance failure.
| Fund | Structure | Investor Liquidity | Approx. Annual Dividend Yield | Cash Distributed Since Dec 2023 | 2024–2026 Total Return (Est.) | NAV Transparency |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chicago Atlantic REFI · NASDAQ |
Public REIT | ✓ Sell any day | $0.47/qtr · ~14–17% annually Paid every quarter, uninterrupted |
~$4.23/share paid since Dec 2023 | ~+17% total return | ✓ Real-time |
| AFC Gamma AFCG · NASDAQ |
Public REIT | ✓ Sell any day | $0.48 → $0.15/qtr (cut 69%) ✓ Still paying — dividend cut but never stopped · ~22% yield on current price (~$2.62) |
~$2.60/share paid since Dec 2023 Reduced but paid continuously — investors could exit at any time |
~-60% total return | ✓ Real-time |
| Pelorus Capital Group Private LLC — Locked |
Private LLC | ✗ Suspended Dec 2023 | De minimis (2024–2025) 0% — Halted April 30, 2026 |
De minimis only (2024–2025) $0 since April 30, 2026 |
~-18% · $46M in self-dealing loan defaults | ✗ None |
The Cash Flow Math: What Pelorus Investors Have Lost by Being Locked In
A Pelorus investor who subscribed with $500,000 and expected comparable income returns has been locked out since December 2023 — receiving only de minimis distributions, with all distributions halted entirely as of April 30, 2026. A comparable investor in Chicago Atlantic (REFI) would have collected approximately $175,000–$200,000 in dividends over the same period while retaining full ability to sell at any time. That income shortfall is permanent and unrecoverable — it is not a paper loss, it is cash that was never paid. Pelorus management has provided no credible timeline for resuming distributions or returning principal.
Return and yield estimates for AFCG and REFI are approximate based on publicly available NASDAQ pricing and dividend history (May 2023 – May 2026). AFCG: price declined ~80% over 36 months; total return approximately -60% including dividends paid. REFI: price declined ~18–20% over 36 months; total return approximately +17% including dividends, demonstrating that dividend income more than offset share price decline. Pelorus has never published independently verified performance data. The $46M in loan defaults represents approximately 13% of the Fund's total assets, per the filed arbitration demand.
Total return = price appreciation / depreciation PLUS dividends received. Approximate; based on public NASDAQ/NYSE data and company investor relations filings.
| Year | Chicago Atlantic (REFI) | AFC Gamma (AFCG) | Pelorus Capital Group |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | $0.47/quarter · $1.88/year ~13–14% annual yield · Paid every quarter without interruption |
~$1.30/share paid · Dividend yield paid throughout Reduced during year — but investors received cash income and could exit at any time |
De minimis · Capital Locked De minimis distributions only. No redemptions. No public NAV. No timeline. |
| 2025 | $0.47/quarter · $1.88/year ~15–17% annual yield · Dividend held flat all year |
~$0.77/share paid · Dividend yield paid throughout Lower than 2024 — but investors received cash income and could exit at any time |
De minimis · Capital Locked De minimis distributions continued. All distributions halted entirely April 30, 2026. |
| YTD 2026 (through May) |
$0.47/quarter paid April 2026 ~16.9% annualized yield · Uninterrupted |
$0.15/quarter · ~22% annualized yield Still paying · Investors retain full liquidity to sell at any time |
$0.00 Distributed All distributions halted April 30, 2026. No redemptions. No timeline. |
| 2024–2026 Cumulative | ~$4.23/share in dividends paid Consistent income + full liquidity maintained throughout |
~$2.60/share paid since Dec 2023 ✓ Paid cash to investors every quarter — full liquidity maintained throughout |
~-18% Total Return · $0 Income $46M in self-dealing loan defaults. De minimis yield only. $0 since April 2026. Principal locked. |
Note: AFCG's challenges are real — dividend cut 69%, ~-60% total return. But AFCG never stopped paying. Investors received ~$2.60/share in cash distributions since December 2023, could sell their position any day, and had full transparency via public SEC filings. Even the worst-performing public cannabis REIT kept paying its investors. Pelorus denied investors both income AND any ability to exit. That is the critical difference.
In 2024–2025, Pelorus management proposed and passed a spinoff into the "Pelorus Growth Fund." The investor arbitration demand describes its primary purpose plainly: "to name themselves as managers of the new entity and create additional and unnecessary management fee income for themselves." The spinoff vote itself was tainted — during the voting window, management went into default on multiple loans and concealed competing bids that would have been better for investors.
But here is what makes the Growth Fund story even worse: Pelorus has not raised meaningful capital into the Growth Fund. They voted to pay themselves double management fees — on both the original Fund and the new Growth Fund — but have attracted little to no new investor capital. The Growth Fund is not a real strategy. It is a fee extraction mechanism being pursued by managers who have lost the confidence of the market. If the market won't invest with them in a new vehicle, why should existing investors trust them with the current one?
Meanwhile, the $46 million in loans that Leimel and Sechrist secretly made to themselves — and then defaulted on — remain inside the Fund. Those loans are underwater. They are causing real investor losses. And management continues to spend Fund capital on legal expenses to conceal and defend the very self-dealing that created this crisis. Every dollar spent defending their misconduct is a dollar taken from the investors they are supposed to serve.
These managers have lost the ability to raise capital, have defaulted on loans they made to themselves, and are using investor money to defend their own wrongdoing. They must be removed.
Your capital has been locked for 30 months. Qualified replacements are ready. Join the coalition.
Join the Coalition →All documents below are filed in public court or arbitration proceedings. They are part of the legal record and available to any member of the public.
Read the documents. Know the facts. Join the growing coalition of investors demanding change.
Join the Coalition →Travis Goad was the sole non-conflicted Managing Partner of Pelorus Capital Group LLC. For more than two years, he fought internally to force disclosure of the related-party loans to investors, auditors, and regulators. When Leimel and Sechrist made it impossible to fulfil his duties — excluding him from strategy decisions, diluting his committee vote, firing the independent counsel, and retaliating against him personally — he resigned in writing on May 29, 2024.
The letter also references ongoing SEC inquiries and auditor concerns at the time of writing. It identifies Greenspoon Marder LLP — whose unpaid fees are the subject of Litigation #7 — as the independent counsel retained to investigate the self-dealing, and states that their engagement was terminated before their findings could be acted upon. The events described in the letter are consistent with the allegations subsequently made in filed legal proceedings.
After resignation: Leimel and Sechrist purportedly attempted to expel Goad and strip him of all economic interests in both the Fund and the Managing Partner — retaliation that is itself the subject of active arbitration proceedings.
May 29, 2024
Via electronic mail
Pelorus Capital Group, LLC
124 Tustin Avenue, Suite 200, Newport Beach, CA 92663
c/o Jason R. Outlaw, Alston & Bird (Jason.Outlaw@alston.com)
Re: Travis Goad — Resignation
Dear Jason:
As you are aware, we represent Travis Goad in his personal capacity and his role as President of TGCA PEL LLC in connection with his rights, duties and obligations as a partner of and investor in Pelorus Capital Group, LLC and its affiliated entities (collectively, "PCG"). Thank you for your recent assistance in providing greater transparency to Mr. Goad regarding the ongoing SEC inquiries and concerns expressed by the Fund's current auditors.
Mr. Goad has been hopeful that the issues described in this letter and the issues that we have discussed previously could be resolved in a manner that would allow him to continue to serve properly the interests of the Fund and its investors. However, at this time, it does not appear that he can do so. This letter shall serve as notice of Mr. Goad's resignation from the officer positions he holds with PCG, as defined by Section 5.5 of the Pelorus Capital Group, L.L.C. Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement, dated as of January 3, 2023, effective immediately.
Mr. Goad is resigning for the reasons stated below, which are not intended to be complete recitations, either factually or legally, of the basis for his decision.
First, Mr. Goad initially became aware in either late 2021 or early 2022 of a single, personal ownership interest held by Mr. Leimel and Mr. Sechrist in an investment that utilized PCG investor capital but was not disclosed to PCG, Mr. Goad or PCG investors. Mr. Goad immediately raised his concerns to Mr. Leimel, Mr. Sechrist and outside counsel. Mr. Leimel and Mr. Sechrist assured Mr. Goad that they would promptly divest their ownership interest and/or satisfy the loan in full, and would never use investor funds for personal projects in the future.
In approximately the next twelve months, Mr. Goad became aware that, contrary to their representations, Mr. Leimel and Mr. Sechrist did not divest their interest in the first loan and instead increased the amount of PCG investor capital lent to themselves without informing Mr. Goad. In addition, Mr. Goad and other PCG professionals conducted further due diligence and learned that Mr. Leimel and Mr. Sechrist also held undisclosed ownership interests in three other investments that utilized PCG investor funds, almost all of which were substantially increased in size in 2022, also unbeknownst to Mr. Goad. None of the Related Party Loans were vetted through the PCG investment committee.
Specific Loan Manipulation — Morongo II (documented in the letter):
LTC ratios for Related Party Loans: 122–135% vs. 56–88% for all other Fund loans originated at the same time. The self-dealing loans were made at more than double the leverage of every other loan in the portfolio.
Second, Mr. Goad persistently pressed the issues relating to the Related Party Loans with Fund counsel at Alston & Bird. At Mr. Goad's insistence, A&B Corporate Counsel designed and implemented the PCG Related Party Committee ("RPC") in the fall of 2023 and appointed Mr. Goad as the sole unconflicted member. A&B Corporate Counsel further authorized the retention of independent counsel. Mr. Leimel, Mr. Sechrist and A&B Corporate Counsel expressly approved the selection of Greenspoon Marder as RPC independent counsel.
The RPC, as advised by Greenspoon Marder, issued a report (January 12, 2024) that analyzed the out-of-market nature of the Related Party Loans and made initial proposals regarding full disclosure and remediation. Mr. Leimel and Mr. Sechrist unequivocally rejected the recommendations and instead provided a response containing inaccurate information. The RPC issued a second clarifying report (February 21, 2024). Mr. Goad asked that these reports be shared with PCG investors and regulators but has not been informed whether such disclosures were made.
Third, Mr. Leimel unilaterally terminated the RPC independent counsel [Greenspoon Marder] rather than address the RPC recommendations. Mr. Leimel and Mr. Sechrist continued making unilateral decisions with respect to the Related Party Loans over the RPC's objections — including modifying and upsizing the "Leave It To Beaver" loan while it was in default. Fund counsel advised in writing (March 13, 2024) that Leimel and Sechrist were acting contrary to the RPC and contrary to Fund counsel's own opinion.
Fourth through Seventh, Leimel and Sechrist refused to consult with Mr. Goad and the RPC; ignored demands for full disclosure to investors, auditors, and regulators; and affirmatively misled Mr. Goad and the RPC about representations they made to investors, auditors, and regulators. They sharply restricted Fund counsel's ability to share information with Mr. Goad.
Eighth, Leimel and Sechrist took retaliatory measures against Mr. Goad, including: manufacturing a false record against him following the RPC's formation; excluding him from the vast majority of PCG strategy and decision-making since fall 2023; and taking steps to dilute his vote on the investment committee in a PCG Board meeting dated February 21, 2024 — without informing Mr. Goad of the change. He learned of it from a third party nearly a month later.
"In sum, Mr. Goad cannot exercise his duties and obligations as an officer of PCG under these circumstances... Notwithstanding his resignation, Mr. Goad will remain available to provide the requisite transparency to PCG regulators, auditors and investors to ensure fulfilment of PCG's obligations. Mr. Goad reserves all of his rights and remedies, both on behalf of PCG and personally, with regard to these matters."
Sincerely,
Samidh Guha
Counsel to Travis Goad · Guha PLLC · New York, NY
cc: Dan Leimel Jr., Robert Sechrist, Donald Hammett, Lane Folsom, Roger Cowie (personal counsel to Leimel and Sechrist)
The whistleblower who tried to protect your investment is still fighting. Join him.
Join the Coalition →The most common investor concern about removing management is: "Then what?" The investor coalition has already answered that question. We have identified and are in active discussions with at least two qualified, experienced management candidates — each with a documented track record of stepping into distressed fund situations and delivering results for investors. This is not a theoretical plan. Experienced, non-conflicted resources are available and ready to act.
The second candidate brings deep experience as a fiduciary and manager for limited partnerships with distressed real estate assets, complex entity structures, urgent debt restructuring needs, and troubled cannabis development projects. The candidate is affiliated with a national restructuring specialty firm with an established track record in cannabis.
Together, these candidates represent experienced, expert, efficient, and non-conflicted resources — ready to step in, stabilize the Pelorus Fund portfolio, work through distressed positions, and return capital to investors. This is something current management has entirely failed to do for 30+ months.
Register below to join the coalition and receive updates on the management transition process.
Qualified replacements are ready. Full recovery of capital is possible. Register your support now.
Join the Coalition →All information is confidential. Your submission is shared only with legal counsel coordinating this effort. We will contact you regarding next steps.
Thank you. Your information has been recorded and will be shared with legal counsel. You will receive a follow-up email within 48 hours with information on next steps.
Investor Coalition Actively Organizing — Numbers Growing
A growing coalition of Pelorus Fund limited partners has registered support for management removal at changepelorusmanagement.com. The coalition is coordinating with legal counsel from Baker Hostetler LLP, Venable LLP, and affiliated attorneys. Fund debt of $122 million remains due September 2026 with no resolution plan announced.
All Pelorus Fund Distributions Halted Entirely
After more than two years of de minimis distributions, Pelorus Capital Group ceased all fund distributions as of April 30, 2026. Investors — who have been unable to redeem since December 2023 — now receive zero income and have no exit path. Q1 2026 YTD net IRR was reported at -2.38%, following -16.02% for full-year 2024.
Petition to Confirm $347K Arbitration Award Filed — Orange County Superior Court
Venable LLP filed a petition in Orange County Superior Court (Case No. 30-2026-01562493) to confirm an arbitration award of $347,414.84 plus an order for Pelorus Capital Group to produce books and records. Despite the award, Pelorus has continued to resist producing documents. View full litigation detail →
Howell v. M3CP Holdings, JRS Capital & Lost Winds Capital — Complaint Filed
A second investor complaint filed in Orange County Superior Court (Case No. 30-2025-01516713) names Pelorus-affiliated entities M3CP Holdings, JRS Capital, and Lost Winds Capital. The filing targets the network of related-party entities alleged to have received investor capital.
Howell v. Pelorus Fund REIT — Breach of Contract Complaint Filed
Investor Rick Howell filed a breach of contract complaint in Orange County Superior Court (Case No. 30-2025-01513886) against Pelorus Fund REIT, LLC and related entities, represented by Shulman Bastian Friedman Bui & O'Dea LLP.
Managing Partner Resigns — References Ongoing SEC Inquiries
The sole non-conflicted managing partner of Pelorus Capital Group resigned in writing via counsel Samidh Guha (Guha PLLC), citing eight documented grounds including the undisclosed related-party loans, the termination of independent investigative counsel (Greenspoon Marder LLP), and references to ongoing SEC inquiries. Read the full letter →
Pelorus Fund Fully Gated — Redemptions Suspended
Pelorus Capital Group suspended all investor redemptions in December 2023. The gate has remained in place for over 30 months with no credible timeline for resolution. Approximately 1,000 limited partners are locked in with no ability to exit their positions.
$52 Million in Undisclosed Related-Party Loans First Discovered
According to filed arbitration proceedings, the first undisclosed related-party loan — in which Daniel Leimel Jr. and Rob Sechrist held personal ownership interests funded by investor capital — was discovered in late 2021 or early 2022. By 2022, three additional undisclosed loans had been identified, all substantially increased without investor or committee approval. Total exposure: approximately $52 million. Approximately $46 million has defaulted and remains in the fund.
If you were directed to changepelorusmanagement.com while searching for the Pelorus Capital Group investor portal, you are in the right place. The fund has been fully gated since December 2023 — meaning investor redemptions are suspended and no distributions have been paid. This site exists to inform Pelorus Fund investors of their rights and coordinate a formal management change. To register your support or share your investor statement, please use the form below.
As of June 2026, the Pelorus Fund remains fully gated — all investor redemptions are suspended. The fund reported a YTD net IRR of -2.38% for Q1 2026, following -16.02% in 2024. Total fund debt stands at approximately $122 million due September 2026, including a $70 million line of credit fully drawn and a $50 million senior secured note. Twelve REO assets carry negative implied equity of approximately -$18.1 million. No timeline for gate removal has been provided to investors.
Filed legal proceedings allege that Daniel Leimel Jr. and James Robert Sechrist (Rob Sechrist), as managing partners of Pelorus Capital Group, directed approximately $52 million in investor capital into undisclosed related-party loans — investments in which Leimel and Sechrist held personal ownership interests. These loans were never disclosed to limited partners, were not vetted through the investment committee, and were not reported to auditors. Seven separate legal actions are currently active, including investor complaints, arbitration demands, and proceedings related to unpaid professional fees.
A growing coalition of Pelorus Fund investors is coordinating through this site and through legal counsel. If you are a current or former Pelorus investor and want to connect with the coalition, please register your support using the form on this page, or email pelorusinvestor@gmail.com. Your information will be shared only with the legal counsel coordinating the management removal effort.
Yes. There are at least seven active or recent legal proceedings involving Pelorus Capital Group, its managing partners, and related entities. These include investor-filed complaints in state court, a FINRA arbitration demand, an SEC-referenced inquiry, and proceedings relating to unpaid legal and advisory fees. All filed documents referenced on this site are part of the public record and are available for download in the Documents section above.
Under the Pelorus Capital Group LLC Operating Agreement, limited partners holding a majority interest can vote to remove fund management. The coalition is working toward assembling the required investor signatures. Once a sufficient number of investors formally register their support, legal counsel will coordinate the formal removal process. This site is the central registration point for that effort. Registering your support does not obligate you to any legal action — it simply records your identity as an investor and your support for a governance change.